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COMMENTS
WISCONSIN AND THE UNIFORM CHILD
CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT: IN WHOSE
HAND SOLOMON'S SWORD
And the king said, bring me a sword. And they brought a
sword before the king. And the king said, Divide the living
child in two, and give half to one and half to the other. I,
With the adoption of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdic-
tion Act2 (the Act), the Wisconsin Legislature has taken a
major step toward eliminating much of the uncertainty and
confusion which have traditionally surrounded child custody
proceedings. Judicial decisions in this area require the wisdom
of Solomon, even without the presence of the complex jurisdic-
tional issues which frequently arise in custody disputes. One
commentator has noted that the "judge agonizes more about
making the right decision in a contested custody issue than
about any other decision he renders." 3 The Act serves to ease
the burden of the judge by permitting the courts to apply local
law for the purpose of determining the best interests of the
child, and setting forth a useful framework for resolving juris-
dictional questions.
The recurrence of complex jurisdictional issues in child cus-
tody suits can be attributed to many factors. Among these are
the failure of the United States Supreme Court' to render a
definitive decision regarding the relationship between the full
faith and credit clause5 and child custody decrees; no fault
1. 1 Kings 3:24, 3:25.
2. 1975 Wis. Laws, ch. 283, § 9 (subsequently amended to eliminate all unnecessary
distinctions based upon sex, 1975 Wis. Laws, ch. 421, §§ 422-434). The Act was ap-
proved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and the
American Bar Association in 1968. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT, 9
UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 99 (1975), Comment, Prefatory Note p. 99 [hereinafter cited as
UCCJA].
3. B. BoTEiN, TRIAL JUDGE 273 (1952).
4. Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: A Legislative Rem-
edy for Children Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 22 VmN. L. REv. 1207, 1213 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Bodenheimer].
5. Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may
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divorce, which often forces parents to vent their anger and
frustration in custody battles;' and the increasing mobility of
our society? Commentators and courts recognized that the con-
cepts of jurisdiction and comity did not provide an adequate
basis for handling the complexities of child custody litigation
and that an alternative approach was needed.8
In seeking such a solution a uniform law appeared to be the
most viable alternative.' The Uniform Child Custody Act re-
sulted. Acceptance of the Act has been slow, but ten of the
eleven states that have adopted the Act have done so in the
past four years.'0 Although the effectiveness of the Act does not
depend on reciprocal adoption by other jurisdictions, the "full
benefits will not be reaped until a large number of states have
enacted it."" The Act, although not immune from criticism,'"
has been described as "an authoritative statement of the rules
currently to be preferred."' 3
by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceed-
ings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. The "Manner in which such Acts . . . shall be proved" is
provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1970).
6. Bodenheimer, The Rights of Children and the Crisis in Custody Litigation:
Modification of Custody in and out of State, 46 CoLo. L. REv. 495, 496 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Bodenhiemer, Modification].
7. V. PACKARD, A NATION OF STRANGERS (1972).
8. Ehrenzweig, The Interstate Child and Uniform Legislation: A Plea for Extra-
Litigious Proceedings, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1965); Ratner, Child Custody in a Federal
System, 62 MICH. L. REv. 795 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Ratner]; Ratner, Legislative
Resolution of the Interstate Child Custody Problem: A Reply to Professor Currie and
a Proposed Uniform Act, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 183 (1965); Walther, The Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act, 54 MARQ. L. Rav. 161 (1971). Contra, Ehrenzweig, Interstate
Recognition of Custody Decrees: Law and Reason v. The Restatement, 51 MICH. L.
REv. 345 (1951).
9. Bodenheimer, supra note 4, at 1217.
10. The ten adopting states, year of adoption and statutory reference are: Califor-
nia, 1973, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5150-5174 (West); Colorado, 1973, COLO. REv. STAT. §§
14-13-101 to 126; Delaware, 1976, DEL. CODE tit. 13, §§ 1901 to 1925; Hawaii, 1973,
HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 583-1 to -26; Maryland, 1975, MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, §§ 184-207;
Michigan, 1976, MICH. CoMP. LAWS §§ 600.651 to .673; North Dakota, 1969, N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 14-14-01 to -26; Oregon, 1973, OR. REv. STAT. 99 109.70 to .930; Wyoming,
1973, Wyo. STAT. §§ 20-143 to -167.
11. UCCJA Prefatory Note, supra note 2, at 102.
12. Hudak cites five major problems in the Act: (1) it is impracticable and naive,
(2) it lacks explicit standards for judges to follow, (3) its highly subjective "priority in
time" and "inconvenient forum" rules could encourage "seize and run" tactics, (4) it
involves expensive record-keeping, and (5) it is not being enacted into law quickly
enough by the states. Hudak, Seize, Run and Sue: The Ignominy of Interstate Child
Custody Litigation in American Courts, 39 Mo. L. REv. 521, 547 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Hudak].
13. In re Giblin, 304 Minn. 510, -, 232 N.W.2d 214, 221-22 (1975). Although the
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822.01 Purposes of act; construction of provisions
(1) The general purposes of this act are to:
(a) Avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with
courts of other states in matters of child custody which have
in the past resulted in the shifting of children from state to
state with harmful effects on their well-being;
(b) Promote cooperation with the courts of other states
to the end that a custody decree is rendered in that state
which can best decide the case in the interest of the child;
(c) Assure that litigation concerning the custody of a
child takes place ordinarily in the state with which the child
and family have the closest connection and where significant
evidence concerning the child's care, protection, training,
and personal relationships is most readily available, and that
courts of this state decline the exercise of jurisdiction when
the child and family have a closer connection with another
state;
(d) Discourage continuing controversies over child cus-
tody in the interest of greater stability of home environment
and of secure family relationships for the child;
(e) Deter abductions and other unilateral removals of
children undertaken to obtain custody awards;
(f) Avoid relitigation of custody decisions of other states
in this state insofar as feasible;
(g) Facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of
other states;
(h) Promote and expand the exchange of information
and other forms of mutual assistance between the courts of
this state and those of other states concerned with the same
child; and
(i) Make uniform the law of those states which enact it.
(2) This act shall be construed to promote the general
purposes stated in this section.
Bridgette Bodenheimer, Reporter for the drafting commit-
tee, stated that it was the committee's intent that "[e]very
section . . . be applied in the light of its basic purpose, as
expressed in section 1."14 The purposes here listed are rein-
forced and restated throughout the Act. Section 822.01 serves
Minnesota legislature had not passed the UCCJA, the state's high court directed the
lower court in this case to disregard all precedential case law and apply the directives
of the Act.
14. Bodenheimer, supra note 4, at 1219.
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as a touchstone for resolving any interpretative questions
which may arise under the Act.
822.02 Definitions
As used in this act:
(1) "Contestant" means a person, including a parent,
who claims a right to custody or visitation rights with respect
to a child.
(2) "Custody determination" means a court decision
and court orders and instructions providing for the custody
of a child, including visitation rights; it does not include a
decision relating to child support or any other monetary obli-
gation of any person.
(3) "Custody proceeding" includes proceedings in which
a custody determination is one of several issues, such as an
action for divorce or separation, and includes child neglect
and dependency proceedings.
(4) "Decree" or "custody decree" means a custody de-
termination contained in a judicial decree or order made in
a custody proceeding, and includes an initial decree and a
modification decree.
(5) "Home state" means the state in which the child
immediately preceding the time involved lived with the
child's parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent, for at
least 6 consecutive months, and in the case of a child less
than 6 months old the state in which the child lived from
birth with any of the persons mentioned. Periods of tempo-
rary absence of any of the named persons are counted as part
of the 6-month or other period.
(6) "Initial decree" means the first custody decree con-
cerning a particular child.
(7) "Modification decree" means a custody decree
which modifies or replaces a prior decree, whether made by
the court which rendered the prior decree or by another court.
(8) "Person acting as parent" means a person, other
than a parent, who has physical custody of a child and who
has either been awarded custody by a court or claims a right
to custody.
(9) "Physical custody" means actual possession and
control of a child.
(10) "State" means any state, territory, or possession of
the United States, the commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the
District of Columbia.
This section makes no significant departure from present
Wisconsin law. In defining "custody proceedings" the Commis-
[Vol. 61:79
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sioners have given the phrase its broadest meaning.'5 The legis-
lature endorsed this interpretation by stating that "[a]ll pro-
ceedings relating to the custody of children shall comply with
the requirements of Ch. 822" in various sections of the chil-
dren's code,'6 divorce actions'" and support of dependents."
Thus, the provisions of the Act apply to all proceedings at
which a child custody issue may be determined."9
The writ of habeas corpus has been recognized by both stat-
ute20 and case law2' as a permissible procedure for instituting a
custody determination. In Anderson v. Anderson the Wisconsin
Supreme Court approved this practice, permitting a full deter-
mination of custody issues in a habeas corpus proceeding. 2  In
contrast, in criminal cases the writ may only be used to deter-
mine the legality of the detention.
822.03 Jurisdiction
(1) A court of this state which is competent to decide
child custody matters has jurisdiction to make a child cus-
tody determination by initial or modification decree if:
(a) This state is the home state of the child at the time
of commencement of the proceeding, or had been the child's
home state within 6 months before commencement of the
proceeding and the child is absent from this state because of
the child's removal or retention by a person claiming custody
or for other reasons, and a parent or person acting as parent
continues to live in this state; or
(b) It is in the best interest of the child that a court of
this state assume jurisdiction because the child and the
child's parents, or the child and at least one contestant, have
a significant connection with this state, and there is available
in this state substantial evidence concerning the child's pres-
15. UCCJA, § 2, comment at 105-06; see also Hudak, supra note 12, at 542-43.
16. Wis. STAT. § 48.027 (1975).
17. Wis. STAT. § 247.015 (1975).
18. Wis. STAT. § 52.21(3) (1975).
19. However, in an Oregon child abuse case the court noted in response to the
defendant mother's contention that the UCCJA pleading requirements applied to all
such custody hearings, whether interstate or not, that "[t]here is good reason to
question this contention." In support of its questoning the court quoted sections of the
UCCJA Prefatory Note indicating that the purpose of the Act was to prevent the
interstate scuttling of children. In re Tiller, 542 P.2d 934, 936 (1975).
20. Wis. STAT. § 48.15 (1975).
21. Zillmer v. Zillmer, 8 Wis. 2d 657, 100 N.W.2d 564, modified, 101 N.W.2d 703
(1960); State ex rel. Hannon v. Eisler, 270 Wis. 469, 71 N.W. 2d 376 (1955); Bellmore
v. McLeod, 189 Wis. 431, 207 N.W. 699 (1926).
22. 36 Wis. 2d 455, 153 N.W.2d 627 (1967).
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ent or future care, protection, training, and personal relation-
ships; or
(c) The child is physically present in this state, and the
child has been abandoned or it is necessary in an emergency
to protect the child because the child has been subjected to
or threatened with mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise neg-
lected or dependent; or
(d) It appears that no other state would have jurisdic-
tion under prerequisites substantially in accordance with par.
(a), (b) or (c), or another state has declined to exercise juris-
diction on the ground that this state is the more appropriate
forum to determine the custody of the child, and it is in the
best interest of the child that this court assume jurisdiction.
(2) Except under sub. (1)(c) and (d), physical presence
in this state of the child, or of the child and one of the contest-
ants, is not alone sufficient to confer jurisdiction on a court
of this state to make a child custody determination.
(3) Physical presence of the child, while desirable, is not
a prerequisite for jurisdiction to determine custody.
The failure of the United States Supreme Court to rule that
custody decrees are binding in all circumstances" has resulted
in conflicting state jurisdictional rules.
The first Restatement of Conflicts of Laws treated custody
as a status. The location of the status and hence the law to be
applied, was determined by the domicile of the father. 4 This
classification provided a simple standard for determining the
proper forum for resolving custody disputes. However, there
were two major exceptions to this general rule. 25 If the child was
physically present within the forum, the state could exercise
jurisdiction to protect the child. The second exception allowed
a court to take jurisdiction if both custodial adults resided in
the forum. In 1934, when the first Restatement appeared, the
lesser mobility of the American population and the undevel-
oped state of the child's best interest test26 made the applica-
23. The Court has declined to consider the question "as long as a reasonable alter-
native exists." Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 607 (1958).
24. The law of the state of the father's domicile at the birth of a legitimate
child determines the right of custody of the child, which continues until changed
in accordance with the rules stated in §§ 145 to 151.
RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 144 (1934).
25. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 148 (1934).
26. The best interest of the child doctrine is derived from a Pennsylvania Supreme
Court case, Commonwealth v. Addicks, 5 Binn. 520 (1813), and a Kansas decision,
[Vol. 61:79
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tion of the original Restatement rule a oechanical procedure
in most cases.Y However, with the development of the child's
best interest doctrine and the increase in the mobility of the
populace, this rigid rule was soon criticized. For example, Pro-
fessor Stansbury called the Restatement rule "a pure abstrac-
tion put forward to make hard facts fit an a priori theory of
jurisdiction. " 2
The Stansbury article provided the rationale for Sampsell
v. Superior Court,29 which sounded the death knell for the first
Restatement rule. The Sampsells were both California resi-
dents. The wife absconded to Nevada with the child, obtained
a Nevada divorce and was granted custody of the child without
notice to her husband. At the same time, the husband insti-
tuted an action in California seeking both a divorce and a
custody determination. The wife, who had since remarried and
moved to Utah, appeared in the California action and an-
swered, pleading the Nevada divorce decree. The California
trial court dismissed the husband's action based on a lack of
jurisdiction over the mother and child. In reversing the lower
court, Justice Traynor determined that more than one state
could obtain and exercise jurisdiction in a child custody pro-
ceeding."
Prior to Sampsell, the courts considered the three major
bases of jurisdiction-status, the physical presence of the child
within the state and the presence of the two custodial adults,
to be mutually exclusive in their operation. But Justice Tray-
nor used these bases as alternatives in a concurrent jurisdiction
approach.31 In turn, his analysis in Sampsell served as the basis
of the concurrent jurisdiction approach of the Second Restate-
ment 32 which the Wisconsin Supreme Court approved in Greef
Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650 (1881). See also Bliffert v. Bliffert, 14 Wis. 2d 316, 111
N.W.2d 188 (1961).
27. Comment, Conflicting Custody Decrees: In Whose Best Interest? 7 DuQ. L.
Rav. 262, 266-67 (1969).
28. Stansbury, Custody and Maintenance Law Across State Lines, 10 LAw AND
CONTEMP. PROB. 819, 926 (1944).
29. 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197 P.2d 739 (1948).
30. Id. at., 197 P.2d at 750.
31. Id. at , 197 P.2d at 748-50.
32. The revised RESTATEMENT rule provides that:
A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction to determine the custody, or
to appoint a guardian of the person of a child or adult
(a) who is domiciled in the state, or
1977]
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v. Greef.3
The usefulness of the Second Restatement rule was not its
expansion of the number of available forums, but rather its
limiting effect on the exercise of jurisdiction to avoid conflict-
ing custody decrees. The existence of another forum able to
render a decree should persuade courts to exercise a higher
degree of discretion in asserting jurisdiction. Even before ap-
proval of the concurrent jurisdiction rules in Greef, the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court declined to become involved in a custody
jurisdiction dispute, although it admitted that either of two
states could exercise jurisdiction.14 Other states have not been
so farsighted35 and this has given rise to criticism of the concur-
rent jurisdiction theory. One writer has described it as an aban-
donment of any recognizable jurisdictional test.31
To remedy the conflicting situation, Professor Ratner devel-
oped the "established home" theory.37  Other major ap-
proaches38 to the jurisdiction problem had one major weak-
(b) who is present in the state, or
(c) who is neither domiciled nor present in the state, if the controversy is
between two or more persons who are personally subject to the jurisdiction of
the state.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 79 (1971).
33. 6 Wis. 2d 269, 94 N.W.2d 625 (1959). The Wisconsin court adopted the revised
RESTATEMENT rule when it was still at the tentative draft stage.
34. Brazy v. Brazy, 5 Wis. 2d 352, 92 N.W.2d 738 (1958), rehearing denied 93
N.W.2d 856 (1959).
35. See, e.g., Allen v. Allen, 200 Or. 678, 268 P.2d 358 (1954) where two children
were subjected to seven custody contests in nine years in three different states; and
Crowell v. Crowell, 184 Or. 467, 198 P.2d 992 (1948) where the Oregon Supreme Court
had to choose from among five separate decrees made in the Oklahoma and Texas
courts.
36. Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition of Custody Decrees: Law and Reason v.
The Restatement, 51 MICH. L. REv. 345, 352 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Ehrenzweig].
37. Ratner, supra note 8, at 815-23.
38. Ratner summarized the four major provisions in this way:
The Tentative Supreme Court Position.
A state where the defendant is domiciled, a resident, or personally served may
make or modify a decree. A decree may also be modified by a state requested
to enforce it ...
The First Restatement-Jackson Position.
The state of a child's domicile may make or modify a custody decree, the
child taking the domicile of the possessing parent at the time of the initial
proceedings and of the prevailing parent thereafter. . . .A valid custody decree
is entitled to full faith and credit; matters previously decided may not be reliti-
gated in proceedings to enforce or modify it.
The Frankfurter-Physical Presence Position.
The state where the child is physically present has primary authority to
[Vol. 61:79
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ness-the encouragement of self-help tactics. In seeking to find
a workable basis for jurisdiction in child custody proceedings,
Ratner relied on psychological studies which showed that most
children were integrated into American communities after six
months residence.3 1 Under this approach the jurisdiction in
which the child last resided for six months was considered the
child's established home. After this time the child was said to
have had the opportunity to establish enough contacts within
the community to permit a court in that jurisdiction to make
an informed decision concerning the child's best interest. Rat-
ner concluded that jurisdiction should not be predicated on
domicile or residence, but rather, on the court's ability to make
a proper decision."
The largest number of forum decisions will be based on the
Act's major jurisdictional basis-home state, as defined in sec-
tion 822.05 (5). This provision is a variation of Ratner's estab-
lished home doctrine. The selection of the home state as a
proper forum provides a simple standard which is "defined and
certain."4'
Jurisdiction of the home state continues for a period of six
months if the child is removed from its confines or leaves for
any reason. This provision applies to children who have been
abducted by a parent and also to those away at a boarding
school. Because of the extension of home state jurisdiction, a
parent need not follow an abducting parent and child, as pro-
ceedings can still be initiated in the home state. Consistent
with this, subsection 3 provides that the child's presence in the
forum is not necessary to assure the court of jurisdiction.
There are a number of situations where subsection (1)(a)
make or modify a custody decree, although a state where the child is domiciled
or the defendant is legally present may also have due process jurisdiction. The
state where the child is present . . . may enforce [a foreign custody decree].
The Sampsell-Second Restatement Position.
The state where the child is domiciled, the state where the child is physically
present, and the state where the defendant is legally present have concurrent
authority to make or modify a custody decree. . . .[A] state should give re-
spectful consideration to the decision of another state and may enforce it on
comity grounds.
Id. at 807-08 (footnotes omitted).
39. Ratner, Legislative Resolution of the Interstate Child Custody Problem: A
Reply to Professor Currie and a Proposed Uniform Act, 38 S. CAL. L. Rav. 183, 186
(1965) [hereinafter cited as Ratner, Reply].
40. Ratner, supra note 8, at 808-09.
41. Bodenheimer, supra note 4, at 1225.
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will not apply, and thus require the implementation of (1)(b).
One such situation occurs when there is no state where the
child has lived for six months. Also, when the child has not yet
established a home state, and the parent in the previously
established home state has moved from that state, subsection
(1) (b) must also be applied. These two examples pose no philo-
sophical problems when applying the "significant contacts"
test of (1)(b). The lack of a home state will always require a
jurisdictional determination in the best interest of the child.
When using (1)(b) as a basis for exercising jurisdiction,
close reading and interpretation is necessary in view of the
Commission's caveat that "perhaps more than any other provi-
sion of the Act [paragraph (1)(b)] requires that it be inter-
preted in the spirit of the legislative purposes enumerated in
Section 1."12
At present, there has been more judicial interpretation of
(1) (b) than of any other section of the Act. In Brooks v.
Brooks,13 a noncustodial father sought enforcement in Oregon
of a Montana ex parte order which transferred custody rights
from the mother to him. The Oregon Court of Appeals ruled
that there was no basis for the assertion of jurisdicton by Mon-
tana. In discussing the significant contacts test, the court noted
that,
while both parties and the children had substantial previous
contacts with Montana, these contacts had terminated, ex-
cept for intermittent family contacts. The Montana court,
therefore, was not, and is not, in the best position now to
determine the present best interests of the children and the
fitness of the parents, both of whom had left Montana. It is
significant that the Montana court made no findings as to (a)
the present circumstances of the children or (b) the fitness of
either parent."
The case of Turley v. Griffin 5 was decided under a Ken-
tucky child custody statute with a jurisdictional scheme simi-
lar to that of the Act.4" In her divorce action, the mother was
42. UCCJA, supra note 2, at § 3 comment.
43. 20 Or. App. 43, 530 P.2d 547 (1975).
44. Id. at -, 530 P.2d at 551.
45. 508 S.W.2d 764 (1974).
46. 403.260. Custody-Jurisdiction, commencement of proceedings.
(1) A court of this state competent to decide child custody matters has
[Vol. 61:79
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awarded custody of their daughter and then moved out of the
state. The father, seeking a modification of the decree in Ken-
tucky, asserted that both parents and the child had substantial
contacts with the state. Affirming the circuit court's denial of
jurisdiction, the court of appeals relied on the comments to the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act for the proposition
jurisdiction to make a child custody determination by initial or modification
decree if:
(a) This state:
1. Is the home state of the child at the time of commencement of the
proceeding; or
2. Had been the child's home state within 6 months before commencement
of the proceeding and the child is absent from this state because of his removal
or retention by a person claiming his custody or for other reason, and a parent
or person acting as parent continues to live in this state; or
(b) It is in the best interest of the child that a court of this state assume
jurisdiction because:
1. The child and his parents, or the child and at least one contestant, have
a significant connection with this state; and
2. There is available in this state substantial evidence concerning the
child's present future care, protection, training, and person relationships; or
(c) The child is physically present in this state; and
1. Has been abandoned; or
2. It is necessary in an emergency to protect him because he has been
subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse or is neglected or depen-
dent; or
(d) 1. No other state has jurisdiction under prerequisites substantially in
accordance with paragraphs (a), (b) or (c) of subsection (1), or another state has
declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this state is the more appro-
priate forum to determine custody of the child; and
2. It is in his best interest that the court assume jurisdiction.
(2) Except under paragraphs (c) and (d) of subsection (1), physical pres-
ence in this state of the child, or of the child and one of the contestants, is not
alone sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court of this state to make a child
custody determination.
(3) Physical presence of the child, while desirable, is not a prerequisite for
jurisdiction to determine his custody.
(4) A child custody proceeding is commenced in the circuit court:
(a) By a parent, by filing a petition:
1. For dissolution or legal separation; or
2. For custody of the child in the county in which he is permanently resi-
dent or found; or
(b) By a person other than a parent, by filing a petition for custody of the
child in the county in which he is permanently resident or found, but only if he
is not in the physical custody of one of his parents.
(5) Notice of a child custody proceeding shall be given to the child's parent,
guardian, and custodian, who may appear, be heard, and file a responsive plead-
ing. The court, upon a showing of good cause, may permit intervention of other
interested parties.
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.260 (Baldwin 1976).
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that the "purpose is to limit jurisdiction. The alternative juris-
diction should serve the best interests of the child, not the
convenience of the parent."47 To counter the contention that
there were sufficient contacts between the forum and the ab-
sent mother and child, the court stated that "[t]here must be
a maximum rather than a minimum contact with the state.
' 48
A result contrary to the intent of the Act was reached in the
Colorado case of Nelson v. District Court.4" Both mother and
father were Colorado residents who had been divorced in Okla-
homa. Custody of their child was given to a guardian in Mon-
tana who then took the child to Colorado. The mother ab-
ducted the child and refused to release him. A writ of habeas
corpus was brought by the guardian, and the mother sought
relief in Colorado under the "strong contacts" provision of the
Act. The Colorado Supreme Court found that the state trial
court could exercise jurisdiction. It relied on four factors for the
conclusion that Colorado's basis for jurisdicton outweighed
that of the child's home state of Montana: (1) both parents
lived in Colorado; (2) all parties sought remedies through the
Colorado courts; (3) sufficient evidence was available in Colo-
rado as both the maternal and paternal grandparents lived in
Colorado; and (4) it was in the child's best interest. Three of
the seven judges, in dissent, charged that the majority emascu-
lated the section. The dissent correctly pointed out that both
the parent and the child are required to have significant con-
tact with the jurisdiction." When confronted with a claim for
jurisdiction under (1)(b), the court should examine the situa-
tion carefully to insure a result in harmony with the purposes
of the Act. If there is a viable alternative jurisdiction, the com-
peting claims should be decided under the rules in sections
822.06 and 822.07.51
The parens patriae power of the state is codified in para-
graph (1)(c). The exercise of jurisdiction in this manner is re-
served for "extraordinary circumstances. "52 The section is con-
sistent with present Wisconsin law as set forth in Zillmer v.
47. 508 S.W.2d at 766.
48. Id.
49. 186 Colo. 381, 527 P.2d 811 (1974).
50. Id. at _, 527 P.2d at 814.
51. Bodenheimer, supra note 4, at 1226-27, 1230-31.
52. UCCJA, supra note 3, at § 3 comment. See also Bodenheimer, supra note 4, at
1229-30.
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Zillmer.53 In Zilimer, the mother was hospitalized in Kansas for
mental illness and the children were brought to the home of her
husband's parents in Wisconsin. After being declared compe-
tent, she filed a divorce action against her husband, also a
Kansas resident. The divorce was granted, and the Kansas
court, aware of the children's presence in Wisconsin, awarded
custody to the mother. The children's grandparents, allegedly
fearing for the children's safety, refused to surrender them in
the face of a writ of habeas corpus filed in Wisconsin by the
mother. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the trial court
finding that the Kansas divorce was res judicata and ordered
the grandparents to return the children to their mother. How-
ever, on motion for rehearing, the judgment was modified per-
mitting the children to remain with their grandparents for sixty
days to allow the father time to seek a modification of the
Kansas divorce decree. The emphasis placed on the safety of
the children was the key factor in the supreme court's modifi-
cation on rehearing. It was noted by the court that,
further reflection has not altered our conclusion that the
question of custody ought to be decided in Kansas court, and
counsel has not attempted to show that the law of Kansas
would prevent further consideration there. Because of the
concern for the welfare of the children engendered by the
opinion of the medical witness, however, we have concluded
that it will be an appropriate exercise of the power of the
Wisconsin court to permit the children to remain in the tem-
porary custody of the grandparents pending institution and
disposition of an application to the Kansas court for modifi-
cation of its judgment insofar as it relates to custody. 4
Another attempt to use the parens patriae power to modify
an out-of-state decree was defeated by the Colorado Supreme
Court.55 A Colorado resident brought his son to Colorado and
asked the trial court to invoke its emergency jurisdiction under
(1) (c) and modify a Kansas decree which awarded custody to
the mother. Colorado's Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's refusal to exercise jurisdiction, holding that the Act
allows a court to enter a temporary order to protect the child
but does not permit modification of foreign custody decrees. "6
53. 8 Wis. 2d 657, 100 N.W.2d 564, modified, 101 N.W.2d 703 (1960).
54. Id. at 662a-662b, 101 N.W.2d at 704. See also Ratner, supra note 8, at 833.
55. Thomas v. Thomas, 86 Colo. App. 96, 537 P.2d 1095 (1975).
56. Id. at -, 537 P.2d at 1096.
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The parens patriae power of a court was also considered by
the California Supreme Court in Ferreira v. Ferreira.7 There,
the court held that "[tlhe greatest discretion given the trial
court in custody matters cannot embrace the power to order
children into asserted peril without inquiry into the reality of
the danger. '5 8 Although decided prior to California's adoption
of the Act, the Ferreira court, relying on the Traynor-Second
Restatement rule, reached a result consistent with the princi-
ples of the Uniform Act. "9
Paragraph (1) (d) operates only as a saving clause for situa-
tions which do not fall within any other section, or in the case
where another jurisdiction declines to exercise its power in the
belief that the courts of another state could make a more in-
formed decision. The commission considered this section
"subsidiary in nature."6
Section (2) is specifically directed toward attempted legi-
timization by a non-custodial parent in another forum. Paren-
tal kidnapping is often assisted by the willingness of foreign
jurisdictions to modify child custody decrees. Mere physical
presence of the child and a custodian is not alone sufficient to
justify the assertion of jurisdiction by a foreign court; to do so
would run counter to the "basic notion of the Act.""1 This sec-
tion should be used in conjunction with section 822.08 (1),2
which authorizes the court to refuse a grant of jurisdiction
where the petitioner has control of the child in violation of a
custody decree of another state. Effective use of this section
will prevent utilization of what was formerly the best possible
argument in a custody case-possession of the child.63
Subsection (3) is a companion to the final clauses in subsec-
tions (1)(a) and (2). The six month extension of the home state
jurisdiction for a child away from an established home is rein-
forced by subsection (3). This provision is consistent with the
Act's deemphasis of the importance of the physical presence of
the child." The child's accessibility to the court is not as criti-
57. 9 Cal. 3d 824, 512 P.2d 304, 109 Cal. Rptr. 80 (1973).
58. Id. at 840, 512 P.2d at 315, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
59. See 62 CAL. L. REv. 365-66 and n. 3 (1974).
60. UCCJA, supra note 3, at § 3 comment.
61. Bodenheimer, supra note 4, at 1227-28.
62. See text accompanying notes 94-106, infra.
63. See generally Hudak, supra note 12.
64. Ratner, Reply, supra note 39, at 191. But cf. Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604,
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cal as it was before the Act's adoption. The jurisdictional
scheme of the Act is structured to minimize the advantage
gained by taking the child to another state. 5
822.04 Notice and opportunity to be heard
Before making a decree under this act, reasonable notice
and opportunity to be heard shall be given to the contestants,
any parent whose parental rights have not been previously
terminated, and any person who has physical custody of the
child. If any of these persons is outside this state, notice and
opportunity to be heard shall be given pursuant to s. 822.05.
This section is consistent with prior Wisconsin law regard-
ing the requirement of notice in child custody cases. In Jones
v. Jones,6" the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that "where
there is jurisdiction, due process is satisfied if there is reasona-
ble notice of the proceedings. 6 7 The Act adopts the notice
requirements of Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure" for parties
to the action who are within the state." The intrastate notice
requirement of this section is not expected to produce any
major problems. The more complex situations involving per-
sons outside Wisconsin are covered under section 822.05.
822.05 Notice to persons outside this state; submission to
jurisdiction
(1) Notice required for the exercise of jurisdiction over
a person outside this state shall be given in a manner reasona-
bly calculated to give actual notice, and may be:
(a) By personal delivery outside this state in the manner
prescribed for service of process within this state;
(b) In the manner prescribed by the law of the place in
which the service is made for service of process in that place
in an action in any of its courts of general jurisdiction.
(c) By any form of mail addressed to the person to be
served and requesting a receipt; or
(d) As directed by the court, including publication, if
other means of notification are ineffective.
613-14 (1958), where the dissenting Justice Frankfurter maintained that the presence
of the child within the jurisdiction should be an absolute prerequisite to a custody
determination.
65. Ratner, Reply, supra note 39, at 185.
66. 54 Wis. 2d 41, 194 N.W.2d 627 (1972).
67. Id. at 45, 194 N.W.2d at 630.
68. Wis. STAT. § 801.11 (1975). See generally Clausen and Lowe, The New Wiscon-
sin Rules of Civil Procedure: Chapters 801 to 803, 59 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 19 (1976).
69. UCCJA, supra note 3, at § 4 comment.
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(2) Notice under this section shall be served, mailed,
delivered or last published at least 10 days before any hearing
in this state.
(3) Proof of service outside this state may be made by
affidavit of the individual who made the service, or in the
manner prescribed by the law of this state, the order pur-
suant to which the service is made, or the law of the place in
which the service is made. If service is made by mail, proof
may be a receipt signed by the addressee or other evidence
of delivery to the addressee.
(4) Notice is not required if a person submits to the ju-
risdiction of the court.
Personal service is the most desirable of the authorized
methods as it is the type most likely to give actual notice. 7 The
validity of a decree rendered by the court depends, in large
measure, on the adequacy of the notice served on the parties.
The power of a court to issue orders which bind the parties will
be discussed in more detail below. 71
The main objective of paragraph (1)(b) is to provide com-
patibility with the laws of foreign jurisdictions. Other jurisdic-
tions should be "less likely to object to a manner of service
prescribed in their own law" 72 than to an unfamiliar procedure
of a foreign state.
Use of return receipt mail, a practice known to most Wis-
consin lawyers, fulfills the requirements for (1)(c). This prac-
tice had previously been approved by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in Block v. Block.73 There, the father had given an ad-
dress for himself in Buffalo, New York. After unsuccessful at-
tempts at personal service, a notice and an order to show cause
why visitation should not be terminated was mailed to the
Buffalo address. After the father failed to appear, the court
terminated his visitation rights. In affirming the trial court's
decision, the supreme court held that service by mail was suffi-
cient notice to obtain jurisdiction.
The provision for notice by publication is not found in the
text of the Uniform Act. The commissioners felt that it was of
70. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950);
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
71. See text accompanying notes 122-24, infra.
72. UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE ACT, § 2.01; Comment, 13
UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 99 (1975) [hereinafter cited as UNIF. PROC. ACT].
73. 15 Wis. 2d 291, 112 N.W.2d 923 (1961).
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doubtful constitutionality if used in lieu of other means.'4 The
phrase indicating that notice by publication is permissible
should be interpreted as allowing it to be "used in addition to
the other modes of service. 7 5 If service by publication is cho-
sen, consideration should be given to publishing in the jurisdic-
tion where the person maintains a residence, as well as in the
forum state.
Subsection (3) provides for proof of service and is used in
conjunction with subsection (1)(b) to show compliance with
the rules governing service in a foreign jurisdiction. Service by
certified mail is evidenced by the receipt. The affidavit of serv-
ice merely provides another form of proving compliance with
the Act's notice requirements.
822.06 Simultaneous proceedings in other states
(1) A court of this state shall not exercise its jurisdiction
under this act if at the time of filing the petition a proceeding
concerning the custody of the child was pending in a court of
another state exercising jurisdiction substantially in con-
formity with this act, unless the proceeding is stayed by the
court of the other state because this state is a more appropri-
ate forum or for other reasons.
(2) Before hearing the petition in a custody proceeding
the court shall examine the pleadings and other information
supplied by the parties under s. 822.09 and shall consult the
child custody registry established under s. 822.16 concerning
the pendency of proceedings with respect to the child in other
states. If the court has reason to believe that proceedings may
be pending in another state it shall direct an inquiry to the
state court administrator or other appropriate official of the
other state.
(3) If the court is informed during the course of the pro-
ceeding that a proceeding concerning the custody of the child
was pending in another state before the court assumed juris-
diction it shall stay the proceeding and communicate with
the court in which the other proceeding is pending to the end
that the issue may be litigated in the more appropriate forum
and that information be exchanged in accordance with ss.
822.19 to 822.22. If a court of this state has made a custody
decree before being informed of a pending proceeding in a
court of another state it shall immediately inform that court
74. UCCJA, supra note 3, at § 5 comment.
75. Id. (Emphasis in original).
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of the fact. If the court is informed that a proceeding was
commenced in another state after it assumed jurisdiction it
shall likewise inform the other court to the end that the issues
may be litigated in the more appropriate forum.
It is possible, under sections 822.03 and 822.14, that more
than one state may be able to properly exercise jurisdiction. In
a situation where this is possible, priority in time will, in most
cases, determine which court should proceed with the action.
This offers no conflict with present Wisconsin law.7" The Wis-
consin Supreme Court has stated that the question is one of
policy, rather than power to exercise jurisdiction.7 The Wis-
consin case of Brazy v. Brazy78 is one of many which illustrate
the need for interstate cooperation and the avoidance of juris-
dictional conflict. In Brazy, the parents obtained a divorce in
Wisconsin. The mother was awarded custody and relocated in
California with the child. The father, who had remarried, trav-
eled to California to visit his child. Upon his arrival, he was
served with an order for support and a motion for custody
determination. After obtaining a lawyer in the California pro-
ceeding, the father brought a motion in Wisconsin for a change
in custody. The Wisconsin court issued an order to show cause
why modification of the custody should not be made and also
to enjoin the California proceeding. The mother's Wisconsin
attorney made a special appearance and claimed (1) the Wis-
consin court did not have jurisdiction over the child, (2) it
lacked personal jurisdiction over the mother, and (3) the father
had submitted himself to jurisdiction in California. The court
in California then enjoined the father from proceeding in Wis-
consin, increased the amount of support and curtailed his visit-
ation rights. Meanwhile, back in Wisconsin, the court found
the mother in contempt for proceeding in the California action.
Included in its contempt determination was a finding that the
Wisconsin court had retained jurisdiction. On appeal the Wis-
consin Supreme Court made two determinations. The first was
that both states had jurisdiction. Wisconsin retained it under
the continuing jurisdiction provision of section 247.25. 71 Cali-
76. Brazy v. Brazy, 5 Wis. 2d 352, 92 N.W.2d 738 (1958), rehearing denied 93
N.W.2d 856 (1959).
77. Sheridan v. Sheridan, 65 Wis. 2d 504, 509, 223 N.W.2d 557, 560 (1974).
78. 5 Wis. 2d 352, 92 N.W.2d 738 (1958), rehearing denied 93 N.W.2d 856 (1958).
79. Revision of Judgment. The Court may from time to time afterwards,
on the petition of either of the parties and upon notice to the family court
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fornia's jurisdiction was based on personal service on the father
and the child's residence within the state. In making its second
determination the court, in essence, adopted section 822.06(1)
by ruling that the Wisconsin court's exercise of jurisdiction was
improper, since a court "should not exercise jurisdicton over
subject matter which another court of competent jurisdiction
has commenced to exercise."80
The term "simultaneous proceedings" was interpreted by
the Colorado Supreme Court in Wheeler v. District Court.8' In
Wheeler, the father was granted custody when the parents were
divorced in Illinois. He obtained court permission and moved
to Colorado. Shortly thereafter, one child was voluntarily re-
turned to the mother. Several months later the Illinois Court,
in an ex parte proceeding, modified the decree and ordered the
other children returned to the mother. She then filed an action
in the Colorado court to enforce the Illinois order. The father
cross-petitioned to affirm his custody rights. The trial court
interpreted the Illinois order as a simultaneous proceeding and
found it to be a bar to any action by the Colorado courts.
Although the court dismissed the father's action, it noted that
the situation was a classic example of the type of conduct the
Act was designed to prevent. The Colorado Supreme Court
reversed the trial court, holding that the section,
concerns simultaneous proceedings in other states. It pro-
vides that a state where the children may be (such as Colo-
rado) nevertheless has no jurisdiction, when a proceeding
concerning custody of the children is pending in another state
at the time of filing the petition.
In our view, section [822.06] does not apply. There was
no proceeding pending in Illinois. Once a custody decree has
been rendered in one state, jurisdiction is determined by
other sections under the Act.82
commissioner, revise and alter such judgment concerning the care, custody,
maintenance and education of any of the children, and make a new judgment
concerning the same as the circumstances of the parents and the benefit of the
children shall require. Any change in child support because of alleged change
in circumstances shall take into consideration the earning capacity of each
parent and the parent's spouse, if any.
Wis. STAT. § 247.25 (1975).
80. 5 Wis. 2d at 361, 92 N.W.2d at 742-43.
81. 186 Colo. 218, 526 P.2d 658 (1974).
82. Id. at -, 526 P.2d at 660.
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Subsections (2) and (3) should be considered as procedural
steps designed to fulfill the objectives of section 822.06(1) and
further the purposes of the Act as stated in section 822.01. At
the time of filing, the court should be informed if there is a
pending action in another forum. If there is another action in
progress, the court must determine whether that action was
commenced under similar jurisdictional provisions.83 However,
the policy against simultaneous proceedings is "so strong that
it might, in a particular situation, be appropriate to defer to
the other court under the circumstances."84
The rule of first in time, first in right is modified by the last
sentence in (3). If the court which first assumes jurisdiction
determines that another court, in which later proceedings were
commenced, is a more appropriate forum, the court of original
jurisdiction should stay its proceedings. The same caveat re-
garding the exercise of alternative jurisdiction under section
822.03(b)85 applies to this provision as well. If a court does
defer, it should direct as much information as it had to the
foreign forum to assist that tribunal in making an informed
decision.
As with several other sections of the Act, section 822.06
cannot be applied in a vacuum. Determination of inconvenient
forum will play a large role in the court's discretionary exercise
of jurisdiction.
822.07 Inconvenient forum
(1) A court which has jurisdiction under this act to make
an initial or modification decree may decline to exercise its
jurisdiction any time before making a decree if it finds that
it is an inconvenient forum to make a custody determination
under the circumstances of the case and that a court of an-
other state is a more appropriate forum.
(2) A finding of inconvenient forum may be made upon
the court's own motion or upon motion of a party or a guard-
ian ad litem or other representative of the child.
(3) In determining if it is an inconvenient forum, the
court shall consider if it is in the interest of the child that
another state assume jurisdiction. For this purpose it may
take into account the following factors, among others:
83. Wis. STAT. § 822.06(l) (1975).
84. UCCJA, supra note 3, at § 6 comment.
85. See text accompanying notes 43-50, supra.
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(a) If another state is or recently was the child's home
state;
(b) If another state has a closer connection with the
child and family or with the child and one or more of the
contestants;
(c) If substantial evidence concerning-the child's present
or future care, protection, training, and personal relation-
ships is more readily available in another state;
(d) If the parties have agreed on another forum which is
no less appropriate; and
(e) If the exercise of jurisdiction by a court of this state
would contravene any of the purposes stated in s. 822.01.
(4) Before determining whether to decline or retain ju-
risdiction the court may communicate with a court of another
state and exchange information pertinent to the assumption
of jurisdiction by either court with a view to assuring that
jurisdiction will be exercised by the more appropriate court
and that a forum will be available to the parties.
(5) If the court finds that it is an inconvenient forum and
tlat a court of another state is a more appropriate forum, it
may dismiss the proceedings, or it may stay the proceedings
upon condition that a custody proceeding be promptly
commenced in another named state or upon any other condi-
tions which may be just and proper, including the condition
that a moving party stipulate consent and submission to the
jurisdiction of the other forum.
(6) The court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction
under this act if a custody determination is incidental to an
action for divorce or another proceeding while retaining juris-
diction over the divorce or other proceeding.
(7) If it appears to the court that it is clearly an inappro-
priate forum it may require the party who commenced the
proceedings to pay, in addition to the costs of the proceedings
in this state, necessary travel and other expenses, including
attorneys' fees, incurred by other parties or their witnesses.
Payment is to be made to the clerk of the court for remittance
to the proper party.
(8) Upon dismissal or stay of proceedings under this sec-
tion the court shall inform the court found to be the more
appropriate forum of this fact, or if the court which would
have jurisdiction in the other state is not certainly known,
shall transmit the information to the court administrator or
other appropriate official for forwarding to the appropriate
court.
(9) Any communication received from another state in-
forming this state of a finding of inconvenient forum because
19771
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a court of this state is the more appropriate forum shall be
filed in the custody registry of the appropriate court. Upon
assuming jurisdiction the court of this state shall inform the
original court of this fact.
This section, used in conjunction with section 822.06, re-
quires the exercise of judicial restraint when a case presents
dual bases for jurisdiction under section 822.03.18
"Inconvenient forum," as used in this section should be
equated with the term "inappropriate forum." The underlying
policy, as with section 822.06, is that the court with the most
information is in the best position to determine the custody of
the child."7
A finding of a more appropriate forum can result from the
presence of the factors listed in subsection (3). The court need
not find all of the considerations there listed to justify a deter-
mination of inconvenient forum. Noticeably absent from this
list of considerations are factors which are usually considered
determinative of such a finding. In a child custody case, hard-
ship or convenience of the parties is of secondary importance
to the best interests of the child."8 The court may stay or dis-
miss the action sua sponte when faced with an inconvenient
forum situation.
An inconvenient forum determination was made in
Gatchell v. Rice.89 There a father sought to enforce a modifica-
tion of a Nebraska custody decree in Oregon. The mother cross-
petitioned for custody based on the alleged unfitness of the
father. In dismissing the mother's claim, the court held that
since the "basic issue was the fitness of the father, who lived
in Nebraska, . . . further proceedings regarding custody
should take place in Nebraska where the [necessary] wit-
nesses . . . could easily be brought to court."9
Wisconsin practitioners should be familiar with the opera-
tion of subsection (5) which is similar in effect to section 801.63
of the Wisconsin Statutes.' In an inconvenient forum situa-
tion, the court has discretionary power to either dismiss or stay
86. Id.
87. See Ratner, supra note 8, at 815-16.
88. UCCJA, supra note 2, at § 7 comment.
89. 16 Or. App. 222, 517 P.2d 1198 (1974).
90. Id. at -, 517 P.2d at 1199.
91. See UCCJA, supra note 2, at § 7 comment.
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the proceedings. One of the innovative features of section
801.63 is that it requires the moving party to waive any statute
of limitation defenses and submit to personal jurisdiction in
the foreign forum as a prerequisite to obtaining a stay of pro-
ceedings. In child custody cases, the statute of limitations is
usually not a critical factor and personal jurisdiction is often
not of issue. However, the grant of power to the court to enforce
such an action is another indication of the desire to have the
most appropriate forum make the decision.
The determination of custody may, in the court's discre-
tion, be severed from a related proceeding. This may be neces-
sary, for example, in a default divorce where one spouse and
the children are not within the jurisdiction. The discretionary
severance provision should eliminate the problems which arise
when a Wisconsin court issues a child custody order, only to
find that no other forum will enforce the decree because a non-
resident faileato appear.92
Subsection (7) is also drawn from a previously existing sec-
tion of the Wisconsin Statutes.93 If the forum chosen is clearly
inappropriate, subsection (7) authorizes the court to order the
party who commenced the action to pay the actual, not merely
the statutory, costs of the action. This provision, like section
814.49, is designed to "deter the assertion of frivolous jurisdic-
tion claims and permit the trial courts to do substantial justice
by taking into account such factors as the good faith of the
plaintiff's jurisdictional claim." 4
The remaining subsections, (8) and (9), relate to the need
for communication regarding custody matters. Efficient use of
these provisions in conjunction with section 822.06(3) should
produce the useful interchange of information envisioned by
the drafters.
822.08 Jurisdiction declined by reason of conduct
(1) If the petitioner for an initial decree has wrongfully
taken the child from another state or has engaged in similar
reprehensible conduct the court may decline to exercise juris-
diction if this is just and proper under the circumstances.
(2) Unless required in the interest of the child, the court
92. See, e.g., May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953); Anderson v. Anderson, 36 Wis.
2d 455, 461, 153 N.W.2d 627, 630 (1967).
93. Wis. STAT. § 814.49 (1975).
94. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 814.49 (West 1975), Revision Note.
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shall not exercise its jurisdiction to modify a custody decree
of another state if the petitioner, without consent of the per-
son entitled to custody, has improperly removed the child
from the physical custody of the person entitled to custody
or has improperly retained the child after a visit or other
temporary relinquishment of physical custody. If the peti-
tioner has violated any other provision of a custody decree of
another state the court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction
if this is just and proper under the circumstances.
(3) In appropriate cases a court dismissing a petition
under this section may charge the petitioner with necessary
travel and other expenses, including attorneys' fees, incurred
by other parties or their witnesses.
Under this section, Wisconsin courts are allowed to deny a
tactical advantage to a parent who wrongfully abducts a
child. 5 The incorporation of the equitable "clean hands" doc-
trine into this section is designed to provide a sanction against
a parent who seeks a more favorable judgment in another
forum. 6 Subsection (1) governs situations arising before an ini-
tial decree is entered, while subsection (2) controls proceedings
after that time.
Both parents are considered to have equal custody rights
until a court intervenes through the issuance of a custody de-
cree. Thus, until such a decree is issued, there can be no viola-
tion of the other's parental rights.17 However, there can be a
wrongful taking within the meaning of the Act when a parent's
conduct is considered shocking to the conscience of the court.
When a parent has acted in such a reprehensible manner, the
"parent should not find the courts. . . waiting with open arms
to give judicial sanction to such actions."98
Once the court has determined that it has jurisdiction
under section 822.14,11 subsection (2) of 822.08 may come into
play. 0 A distinction is made between the improper removal or
95. Fain, The Interstate Child Custody Problem Revisited, 16 FAMILY LAW
NEWSLETrER 1 (1976).
96. Bodenheimer, supra note 4, at 1219. See also Ehrenzweig, supra note 53, at 358-
60.
97. UCCJA, supra note 2, at § 8 comment.
98. Settle v. Settle, 25 Or. App. 579, 550 P.2d 445, 447 (1976). In this case the
mother had cross-petitioned for custody in the suit brought by her husband to enforce
the former state's decree rendered in her absence. The Oregon Court of Appeals re-
versed the trial court's granting of her petition.
99. See text accompanying notes 142-67, nfra.
100. UCCJA, supra note 2, at § 8 comment.
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detention of a child and a violation of any other provision of a
custody decree. In the former case, the statute directs that "the
court shall not exercise its jurisdiction. Detention or removal
of a child is improper when done without special justification
such as illness or similar emergency." 10' Where the parent vio-
lates other provisions of a decree, the court has discretionary
power to decline to exercise its jurisdiction."0 2
Parental misconduct is only one factor to be considered in
the court's decision to exercise jurisdiction. This section must
be read in the light of the child's best interest limitation. 3
Certainly, it would be most "improper to punish the innocent
child for parental misconduct."'0 4 Recognizing that self-help is
an "irresponsible and barbaric remedy,"'0 5 some commentators
have advocated stiff penalties for parental misconduct. 8 How-
ever, the Act places only financial sanctions on such conduct,
similar to those applied under section 822.07(7).107
822.09 Information under oath to be submitted to the
court
(1) Every party in a custody proceeding in the first
pleading or in an affidavit attached to that pleading shall
give information under oath as to the child's present address,
the places where the child has lived within the last 5 years,
and the names and present addresses of the persons with
whom the child has lived during that period. In this pleading
or affidavit every party shall further declare under oath
whether:
(a) The party has participated as a party, witness, or in
any other capacity in any other litigation concerning the cus-
tody of the same child in this or any other state;
(b) The party has information of any custody proceeding
concerning the child pending in a court of this or any other
state; and
(c) The party knows of any person not a party to the
proceedings who has physical custody of the child or claims
101. Id.
102. Cf. Wis. STAT. § 52.10 (1975).
103. Porter & Walsh, The Evolution of California's Child Custody Laws: A Ques-
tion of Statutory Interpretation, 7 S.W.U.L. REv. 1, 29 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Porter & Walsh]; see also Bodenheimer, supra note 4, at 1215.
104. Comment, Legalized Kidnapping of Children by Their Parents, 80 DicK. L.
REv. 305, 319-20 (1976). See also, Ratner, supra note 8, at 814.
105. In re Lang, 9 App. Div. 2d 401, 408, 193 N.Y.S.2d 763, 770 (1959).
106. Bodenheimer, Modification, supra note 6, at 505. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)
(1970) (parental exemption from kidnapping laws).
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to have custody or visitation rights with respect to the child.
(2) If the declaration as to any of the above items is in
the affirmative the declarant shall give additional informaton
under oath as required by the court. The court may examine
the parties under oath as to details of the information fur-
nished and as to other matters pertinent to the court's juris-
diction and the disposition of the case.
(3) Each party has a continuing duty to inform the court
of any custody proceeding concerning the child in this or any
other state of which the party obtained information during
this proceeding.
The court's decision to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction
under sections 822.06, 822.07 or 822.08 will be based on infor-
mation required under section 822.09. From the facts pre-
sented, the court will decide whether additional parties must
be joined or if other jurisdictions must be notified. Courts must
take an active role in determining whether there are any inter-
state considerations included in a child custody hearing. The
information requirement is intended to present the judge with
the most accurate picture of the situation possible. The resi-
dential history of the previous five years assists the court in
making its jurisdictional decision,' while the litigation history
enables the court to determine whether it should decline to
exercise its jurisdiction on grounds of simultaneous proceed-
ing,' 9 inconvenient forum"' or reprehensible conduct.''
The initial pleadings will often indicate that the dispute is
interstate in nature, as in the case where the plaintiff seeks
enforcement or modification of an out-of-state decree. Where
there are interstate aspects to the action, a greater amount of
information is required so that the court may be advised of the
existence and location of other relevant evidence. Without this
additional information requirement, a court might be forced to
make a finding based solely on a "petitioner's own story and
his own witnesses.""112
822.10 Additional parties
If the court learns from information furnished by the par-
107. See text accompanying notes 86-94, supra.
108. Cf. Wis. STAT. § 822.03 (1975).
109. Cf. Wis. STAT. § 822.06 (1975).
110. Cf. Wis. STAT. § 822.07 (1975).
111. Cf. Wis. STAT. § 822.08 (1975).
112. Bodenheimer, supra note 4, at 1243.
[Vol. 61:79
COMMENTS
ties pursuant to s. 822.09 or from other sources that a person
not a party to the custody proceeding has physical custody
of the child or claims to have custody or visitation rights with
respect to the child, it shall order that person to be joined as
a party and to be duly notified of the pendency of the pro-
ceeding and of the person's joinder as a party. If the person
joined as a party is outside this state the person shall be
served with process or otherwise notified in accordance with
s. 822.05.
Since the Act does not specifically define "additional par-
ties," this section should be construed broadly to provide lib-
eral joinder of all parties interested in the action.' 3 In the best
interests of the child, "additional parties" should include not
only relatives and custodial adults, but also any social service
agency closely involved with the child's home environment.
Any party who has or may have an interest in the custody
proceeding should be considered an additional party. This sec-
tion provides that information regarding additional parties
may be obtained from both formal and "informal" sources."'
Attempts to secure such information are aided by the interjur-
isdictional cooperation provisions of sections 822.20 through
822.22.115
822.11 Appearance of parties and the child
(1) The court may order any party to the proceeding who
is in this state to appear personally before the court. If that
party has physical custody of the child the court may order
that the party appear personally with the child.
(2) If a party to the proceeding whose presence is desired
by the court is outside this state with or without the child the
court may order that the notice given under s. 822.05 include
a statement directing that party to appear personally with or
without the child and declaring that failure to appear may
result in a decision adverse to that party.
(3) If a party to the proceeding who is outside this state
is directed to appear under sub. (2) or desires to appear per-
sonally before the court with or without the child, the court
may require another party to pay to the clerk of the court
travel and other necessary expenses of the party so appearing
113. Id. at 1219.
114. UCCJA, supra note 2, at § 10 comment.
115. See text accompanying notes 174-79, infra.
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and of the child if this is just and proper under the circum-
stances.
The presence of all interested parties is necessary if the
court is to make a well-informed decision. Subsection (1) gives
the court the power to compel any party within the state to
appear and, if necessary, bring the child into court.16 This
provision is similar to the Children's Code provision governing
appearances ordered by the court.17
Subsection (2), when used in conjunction with section
822.05,118 empowers the court to render a binding decree even
if the out-of-state party fails to appear. A similar result can be
reached through the use of section 822.19(2) or 822.20(3)."'
While the child's presence is not always essential for the court
to make its determination, 20 the child can and should be or-
dered to appear with the out-of-state parent under the provi-
sion of section 822.19(2) whenever necessary.
The "other necessary expenses" provision of subsection (3)
has been construed to allow a court to require a party to pay
the attorney's fees as well as the travel expenses of an out-of-
state party who appears in the action.' 2' It is reasonable to
allow the court to require a litigant to pay the necessary expen-
ses of a party who comes into the state to appear in the pro-
ceedings. Unfortunately, the Act does not authorize the court
to order payment of expenses other than those incurred for
interstate travel. It is not beyond the imagination that an in-
trastate trip may be more costly and impose a greater hardship
on a potential witness than one which happens to cross a state
line.
822.12 Binding force and res judicata effect of custody
decree
A custody decree rendered by a court of this state which
had jurisdiction under s. 822.03 binds all parties who have
been served in this state or notified in accordance with s.
822.05 or who have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court,
and who have been given an opportunity to be heard. As to
116. UCCJA, supra note 2, § 11 comment.
117. Wis. STAT. § 48.21(3) (1975).
118. See text accompanying notes 70-72, supra.
119. See text accompanying note 178, infra.
120. See text accompanying notes 76-80, supra. Contra, Currie, Full Faith and
Credit, Chiefly to Judgments: A Role for Congress, 1964 Sup. CT. RaEv. 89, 117-18.
121. Thomas v. Thomas, 36 Colo. App. 96, 537 P.2d 1095 (1975).
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these parties the custody decree is conclusive as to all issues
of law and fact decided and as to the custody determination
made unless and until that determination is modified pur-
suant to law, including the provisions of this act.
As pointed out earlier,12 whether a decree merits interstate
recognition depends on its intrastate validity. The main thrust
of this section is to provide that all custody decrees issued by
Wisconsin courts are binding on the parties. A major change
in Wisconsin law is expected to result from the implementation
of this provision.I23 The policy of this section can be described
as one of modified res judicata. The res judicata effect is often
not applied with the "same strictness" 24 to custody decrees as
to other judgments.
The nonfinal nature of custody decrees is evidenced by the
last sentence of this section. A decree is final until the court
chooses to modify it. If the decree is modified, it must be done
within the strictures of the Act. This is necessary to ensure that
the modification will not run counter to the intent of either the
Act or the initial decree.
822.13 Recognition of out-of-state custody decrees
The courts of this state shall recognize and enforce an
initial or modification decree of a court of another state which
had assumed jurisdiction under statutory provisions substan-
tially in accordance with this act or which was made under
factual circumstances meeting the jurisdictional standards of
the act, so long as this decree has not been modified in ac-
cordance with jurisdictional standards substantially similar
to those of this act.
The policy of full faith and creditl2a has seldom been ex-
tended to child custody decisions because of their nonfinal na-
ture. Prior to the Act, a court requested to enforce an out-of-
state decree was under no compulsion to do so. The Restate-
122. See text accompanying notes 66-69, supra.
123. See, e.g., Eule v. Eule, 9 Wis. 2d 115, 100 N.W.2d 554 (1960), cert. denied,
362 U.S. 988 (1960), where the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that an Illinois decree
was not binding because the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over the mother
and child, who were residing in Wisconsin.
124. Miller v. Miller, 15 Wis. 2d 583, 587, 113 N.W.2d 403, 406 (1962); Bliffert v.
Bliffert, 14 Wis. 2d 316, 323, 11 N.W.2d 188, 192 (1961).
125. The doctrine was first applied to a custody decree in Wakefield v. Ives, 35 Iowa
238 (1872). But see Bachman v. Mejias, 1 N.Y.2d 575, 580, 136 N.E.2d 866, 878, 154
N.Y.S.2d 903, 907 (1956), where it was said that the full faith and credit clause does
not apply to custody matters.
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ment of Conflicts of Law provided for enforcement of decrees
of sister states in most cases. However, the drafters of the Re-
statement included one extremely large exception. If there was
a finding of "change of circumstances" since the issuance of the
initial decree, a court could modify that decree if there was a
sufficient jurisdictional basis." 6 The willingness of courts to
modify foreign decrees influenced parents to stay away from
custody proceedings and then attempt to obtain a more favora-
ble result in another jurisdiction.' 27
The problem was further compounded by uncertainty about
the applicability of the full faith and credit clause to custody
decrees. On four occasions, 28 this issue was presented to the
United States Supreme Court. Today, the American courts are
still looking for a definite decision on this question.
The case of May v. Anderson129 involved a couple who were
originally Wisconsin residents. In an attempt to solve their
marital problems, the wife took their child to Ohio. The father,
who stayed in Wisconsin, obtained a default divorce 3 ' and was
awarded custody. Although personally served with a summons
and complaint, the wife did not participate in the proceeding.
When the mother refused to return the child, the father, armed
with the Wisconsin decree, sought a writ of habeas corpus in
Ohio. The trial court refused to issue the writ. However, on
appeal, it was ruled that the Wisconsin decree was entitled to
full faith and credit in Ohio and that the father was, therefore,
entitled to the relief sought.' 3'
In an "inconclusive opinion,' ' 32 the United States Supreme
Court found that personal jurisdiction over the mother had not
been obtained in the default divorce and, as a result, the Wis-
consin court could not cut off her rights in the child. The full
126. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 147, comment b (1934).
127. Hazard, May v. Anderson, Preamble to Family Law Chaos, 45 VA. L. Rav. 379,
393 (1959).
128. Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962); Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958); May
v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953); New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610
(1947).
129. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
130. Wis. STAT. § 247.15 (1949).
131. Anderson v. May, 91 Ohio App. 557, 107 N.E.2d 358 (1952), dismissed for lack
of debatable constitutional question, 157 Ohio St. 436, 108 N.E.2d 648 (1952).
132. UCCJA, supra note 2, at § 13 comment. Four judges joined the majority
opinion while Justice Franfurter wrote concurring opinion and cast the deciding vote
in the 5-3 decision.
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faith and credit guaranteed by the Constitution did not entitle
the personal judgment to extraterritorial effect if it was ren-
dered without jurisdiction over the person whose rights were
affected. 133 The position taken by Justice Frankfurter in his
concurrence has become the accepted interpretation of May. 131
It was Frankfurter's contention that the full faith and credit
clause did not require recognition of the decree but merely
permitted Ohio to recognize it as a matter of state law.
In Ford v. Ford,131 the Court reversed another state court
ruling on the applicability of the full faith and credit clause.
In Ford, a Virginia decree based on a stipulation of the parties
gave custody to the father. While the child was visiting the
mother in South Carolina, she commenced an action seeking
to have custody transferred to her. The father appeared and
relied on the Virginia decree. Both the trial court and appellate
court found, however, that the best interests of the child dic-
tated that the mother be granted custody. On appeal the state
supreme court reversed,' 3 holding that the issue was res judi-
cata in Virginia and that the decree was entitled to full faith
and credit in South Carolina. In reversing the South Carolina
decision, the Supreme Court held that the order of the Virginia
court, being subject to modification upon a showing of changed
circumstances, was not res judicata and not entitled to full
faith and credit. The Court ruled that the full faith and credit
clause did not preclude the South Carolina court from deter-
mining the best interest of the child and entering an appropri-
ate decree.
The drafters of the Act, cognizant of the lack of deference
typically accorded foreign decrees, provided for mandatory rec-
ognition of decrees rendered by tribunals under jurisdictional
standards similar to those of the Act.'37 However, under section
822.03, a court may still take appropriate action where neces-
sary to protect the child.
In the Oregon case of Brooks v. Brooks, 3 1 the validity of a
133. 345 U.S. at 533.
134. UCCJA, supra note 2, § 13 comment.
135. 371 U.S. 187 (1962).
136. 239 S.C. 305, 123 S.E.2d 33 (1961).
137. See text accompanying notes 122-24, supra. See Bodenheimer, supra note 4,
at 1218-19; Hudak, supra note 12, at 545; and Ratner, supra note 8, at 828. But see
Ehrenzweig, supra note 53, at 357-58.
138. 20 Or. App. 43, 530 P.2d 547 (1975).
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modification of a Montana divorce decree was at issue. In the
Montana divorce, the mother had been awarded custody. How-
ever, when she moved to Oregon without court permission,
custody rights were transferred to the father. The father then
sought to enforce the punitive modification" 9 by writ of habeas
corpus in Oregon. The Oregon court recognized the validity of
the modification, but then decided that the Montana court
lacked sufficient evidence to act, and modified the order again.
In affirming the trial court's decision, the Oregon Court of Ap-
peals held that the statute requires enforcement of a custody
decree from a sister state only when the decree meets the stan-
dards of the Act.'40 Since the Montana court did not comply
with the standards set forth in the Act, the modification order
lacked a sufficient basis for enforcement in Oregon.
The Act's policy of enforcement without modification pre-
serves the rights of the prevailing party without subjecting the
other party to any undue hardship. This approach recognizes
the "care and responsibility felt by the original judge who
knows that his custody order may determine the entire course
of life of the child before him."' 4 It also forces a party who is
dissatisified with the outcome of the proceeding to appeal or
attempt a modification in the original forum. This prevents the
party from seeking a "better" judgment in another jurisdiction
and controlling venue of the modification by default.
Prior Wisconsin law is in accord with the policy of this
section. In State ex rel. Kern v. Kern, "I the state supreme court
was called on to determine the validity of a foreign court's
modification of a Wisconsin custody order. The father had been
awarded custody and granted permission to move to Iowa by
the Dane County Circuit Court. After numerous attempts at
modification, the court granted custody to the wife who then
filed a writ of habeas corpus in Iowa. Although the Iowa trial
court had been informed of the Wisconsin decision, it elected
to make a decision on the merits. Before the proceedings were
concluded, the mother spirited the child back to Wisconsin.
139. A punitive modification of child custody decree occurs when the custodial
adult, in some manner, acts in contravention of an order of the court, and the court,
unable to impose any punishment upon the person, attempts to sanction the custodian
by changing custody. See text accompanying note 170, infra.
140. 20 Or. App. at __, 530 P.2d at 551.
141. Bodenheimer, supra note 4, at 1220.
142. 17 Wis. 2d 268, 116 N.W.2d 337 (1962).
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The Iowa court dismissed the mother's habeas corpus proceed-
ing and ruled that custody be returned to the father. The father
then brought a writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court for
Dane County seeking enforcement of the Iowa ruling. The
mother's motion to quash the writ was denied, and the court
ordered the child returned to the father. On appeal, the mother
contended that Wisconsin should not grant full faith and credit
to the Iowa decree as Iowa had failed to accord similar treat-
ment to the Wisconsin order. The court rejected this "two
wrongs equal one right" logic and held that the Iowa decision
was entitled to receive full faith and credit. In this decision, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted a policy which was to ap-
pear seven years later in the initial draft of the Act's out-of-
state recognition provision:
[W]hen . . . a judgment has been recently entered, as was
the case of the Iowa judgment in the instant case, this court,
for policy reasons, is inclined to accord such judgment the
same effect as though it were binding upon us under the full
faith and credit clause. We respect the detemination so re-
cently made by the Iowa court on the merits and refrain from
ourselves re-examining the merits. We regard this as the bet-
ter policy in such circumstances.'
822.14 Modification of custody decree of another state
(1) If a court of another state has made a custody decree,
a court of this state shall not modify that decree unless it
appears to the court of this state that the court which ren-
dered the decree does not now have jurisdiction under juris-
dictional prerequisites substantially in accordance with this
act or has declined to assume jurisdiction to modify the de-
cree and the court of this state has jurisdiction.
(2) If a court of this state is authorized under sub. (1)
and s. 822.08 to modify a custody decree of another state it
shall give due consideration to the transcript of the record
and other documents of all previous proceedings submitted
to it in accordance with s. 822.22.
In the time since the Act was drafted, the emphasis in child
custody cases has shifted from limiting jurisdiction to imposing
restraints on the modification of decrees.' When the Act was
drafted, modification of custody decrees was a common prac-
143. Id. at 273, 116 N.W.2d at 340.
144. Bodenheimer, Modification, supra note 6, at 503.
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tice.45 Courts were seldom reluctant to change any custody
decree, readily finding that there were "changed circumstan-
ces" since the entry of the original order.
Two cases which reached the Supreme Court lent support
to this practice.'" New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey 47 ranks
as the landmark case on the ability of state courts to modify
custody decrees of other jurisdictions. The Halveys were mar-
ried in New York where they had one child. At the onset of
marital difficulties, the wife took the child and moved to Flor-
ida without informing her husband. There she began divorce
proceedings. Service was effected by publication, but the hus-
band did not appear in the action. On the day before the decree
was entered, the father traveled to Florida and took the child
back to his home in New York. The mother was awarded per-
manent custody by the Florida court on the following day. She
then brought a writ of habeas corpus in New York, challenging
the father's detention of the child. The New York court ruled
that custody should remain with the mother, but modified the
Florida order to provide for "substantial visitation" by the fa-
ther. The court also required the mother to post a performance
bond to ensure the presence of the child during the father's
visits. The Supreme Court affirmed the modification by the
New York courts. Since the order could have been modified by
a Florida court, the Court decided that the New York court did
no more than what any Florida court could do. Justice Douglas,
writing for the majority, stated that "the state of the forum has
as much leeway to disregard the judgment, to qualify it or, to
depart from it as does the state where it was rendered.1148 In a
concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter emphasized two com-
peting considerations. The first was the "presumptive jurisdic-
tion of the court of a sister state to render judgment for which
full faith and credit is asked,"'49 and the second, the power of
the forum state to make provisions for the child's welfare. 10
145. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 147 (1934); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 109 (1971). See also A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS 293 (1962); Ehrenzweig, supra note 53, at 352; Hudak, supra note 12, at 536-
37.
146. Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958); New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey,
330 U.S. 610 (1947).
147. 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
148. Id. at 615.
149. Id. at 618.
150. Id.
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Since the initial jurisdiction of the Florida court was doubtful,
Justice Frankfurter concluded that the New York court did not
fail in the duty imposed by the full faith and credit clause.
New York also figured prominently in the second Supreme
Court case which dealt with modification of out-of-state de-
crees. " ' In Kovacs v. Brewer, 52 a New York court awarded
custody of a child of divorced parents to her paternal grand-
father. With the court's permission, the grandfather took the
child to North Carolina. Three years later the court modified
its order and transferred custody to the mother. On the basis
of this modification, the mother filed a writ of habeas corpus
in North Carolina. The court found that circumstances had
changed since the entry of the New York modification, and the
best interests of the child required that she stay with the grand-
father. On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld
the finding of the trial court without specifying any reason,'53
and "went on to declare, seemingly as an alternative ground of
decision, that the New York decree was not binding, because
the divorce court has no jurisdiction to modify the original
custody award after the child had become a resident and domi-
cillary of North Carolina."'54
Certiorari was granted only on the issue of full faith and
credit. Based on the "confused nature" of the state court deci-
sion, eight of the nine Justices reserved decision on all ques-
tions and remanded the case for clarification.'55 Justice Frank-
furter, changing his position from Halvey, stated that there
should be no full faith and credit for child custody decrees. It
was his opinion that the policy of full faith and credit must be
subordinated to the welfare of the child. He argued that requir-
ing North Carolina to justify its decision on the basis of
changed circumstances would imply that the decree had some
legal significance. The welfare of the child was considered to
be sufficient justification for the modification.'
These two Supreme Court decisions did not remove any of
the confusion surrouding modification of out-of-state custody
151. Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958).
152. Id.
153. Kovacs v. Brewer, 245 N.C. 630, - , 97 S.E.2d 96, 100 (1957).
154. 356 U.S. at 606.
155. 356 U.S. at 608.
156. 356 U.S. at 609-16.
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decrees. A state was not compelled to enforce a decree of an-
other jurisdiction. When a foreign order was enforced, most
courts made a point of emphasizing their freedom to modify it
if they so desired. Since the subsequent forum possessed juris-
diction to modify, as well as to enforce, custody decrees were
ineffective beyond state lines.'57 There was nothing to prevent
mobile litigants from engaging in an endless round of custody
modification battles.
Ratner's established home concept,18 codified in section
822.03, provides a workable solution to the problem. The power
to modify custody decrees under the Act is restricted, in most
instances, to courts of the child's home state. This prevents a
dissatisfied parent from initiating proceedings in another juris-
diction, a viable tactic under the Traynor-Restatement rule or
under Justice Frankfurter's position in Kovacs.'5' Under sec-
tion 822.14, a Wisconsin court may not modify an out-of-state
custody decree, except under limited circumstances: (1) where
the court which rendered the decree no longer has jurisdiction
under standards similar to those of the Act, or (2) where the
court which rendered the decree has declined to hear the mat-
ter. Furthermore, the courts of this state must also have juris-
diction under section 822.03 before considering any modifica-
tion petition. It is true that the state possesses the parens pa-
triae power, but this may be asserted only where there is a
substantial emergency which threatens the welfare of the
child. 6'
The Act also discourages punitive modifications directed at
parents who violate orders of the court. This additional limita-
tion on a court's modification power is not only a desirable end
in itself, but also furthers the overall purposes of the Act. Modi-
fications of child custody decrees should be based on the best
interests of the child rather than the offended dignity of the
court. ''
The weight given to transcripts obtained under (2) is a mat-
157. Ratner, supra note 8, at 832.
158. Id. at 815-23.
159. Id. at 813.
160. Porter & Walsh, supra note 103, at 31-32.
161. UCCJA, supra note 2, at § 14 comment. See also Berlin v. Berlin, 239 Md.
52, 210 A.2d 380 (1965) and Berlin v. Berlin, 21 N.Y.2d 371, 235 N.E.2d 109, 288
N.Y.S.2d 44 (1967), modified, 28 App. Div. 877, 237 N.E.2d 358, 290 N.Y.S.2d 663,
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 840 (1968).
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ter of local concern,12 but the opportunity to procure more
information should not be disregarded. A request for tran-
scripts under section 822.22 should provide the court with suffi-
cient information to make an informed determination. The
trial court will benefit not only from the additional information
made available but also from the enlightenment gained
through exposure to another judicial evaluation of the contro-
versy.
Wisconsin follows the majority practice of requiring
changed circumstances before modifying a custody decree.
This rule first appeared in State ex rel. Hannon v. Eisler.'13 In
Eisler, a Wisconsin court modified a custody order from a Win-
nipeg, Canada court. The Canadian court relied on evidence
which indicated that there were large amounts of liquor being
consumed in the home of the maternal grandparents where the
mother was staying. A Wisconsin trial court was informed that
the mother had since remarried and that there was no alcohol
problem in her new home. In addition, the mother subse-
quently was rendered unable to bear any more children. In
light of these circumstances, the supreme court allowed the
trial court's modification to stand, but noted that it would not
have done so had there not been a "substantial change in cir-
cumstances."'64
The changed circumstances requirement was explained by
the court in King v. King,' where it was stated that,
[t]he court, once having fully considered and determined
the issue of custody on the circumstances then existing, ought
not again consider it until there was such a substantial or
material change in circumstances of the parents or of the
child as would require or justify in the interest of the child a
modification of the previous determination. 6'
Wisconsin's position on modification of decrees by appeal
is unchanged by the Act. In Brazy v. Brazy, "I the state's high
court held that if a party is unhappy about the outcome in a
foreign jurisdiction, the remedy is to appeal in that forum. 6 '
162. UCCJA, supra note 2, at § 14 comment.
163. 270 Wis. 469, 71 N.W.2d 376 (1955).
164. Id. at 475, 71 N.W.2d at 380.
165. 25 Wis. 2d 550, 131 N.W.2d 357 (1964).
166. Id. at 554, 131 N.W.2d at 359-60.
167. 5 Wis. 2d 352, 92 N.W.2d 738 (1958), rehearing denied, 93 N.W.2d 856 (1959).
168. 5 Wis. 2d at 360, 92 N.W.2d at 742.
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The court has consistently refused to grant relief when it could
be obtained through another state's appellate procedure.
822.15 Filing and enforcement of custody decree of an-
other state
(1) A certified copy of a custody decree of another state
may be filed in the office of the clerk of any county or circuit
court of this state. The clerk shall treat the decree in the same
manner as a custody decree of a county or circuit court of this
state. A custody decree so filed has the same effect and shall
be enforced in like manner as a custody decree rendered by a
court of this state.
(2) A person violating a custody decree of another state
which makes it necessary to enforce the decree in this state
may be required to pay necessary travel and other expenses,
including attorneys' fees, incurred by the party entitled to the
custody or his or her witnesses.
822.16 Registry of out-of-state custody decrees and
proceedings
The clerk of each county and circuit court shall maintain
a registry in which he or she shall enter the following:
(1) Certified copies of custody decrees of other states
received for filing;
(2) Communications as to the pendency of custody pro-
ceedings in other states;
(3) Communications concerning a finding of inconven-
ient forum by a court of another state; and
(4) Other communications or documents concerning
custody proceedings in another state which may affect the
jurisdiction of a court of this state or the disposition to be
made by it in a custody proceeding.
822.17 Certified copies of custody decree
The clerk of a county or circuit court of this state, at the
request of the court of another state or at the request of any
person who is affected by or has a legitimate interest in a
custody decree, shall certify and forward a copy of the decree
to that court or person.
Once the foreign decree has been filed with the clerk of the
appropriate court, it applies with the same force as if a court
in the state of filing had rendered it. '69 This is true for custody
determinations as well as rulings on visitation privileges.
169. Wis. STAT. § 806.24 (1975) (codification of the UNIFORM ENFORCEMENT OF FOR-
EIGN JUDGMENTS ACT).
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Should any part of the decree become burdensome or impracti-
cal after interstate relocation, the custodial adult may petition
for modification in the proper forum, which will not necessarily
be the new jurisdiction.
Instead of having to resort to a punitive modification which
is often an act of judicial frustration, 7 ' a court having jurisdic-
tion over the custodian may impose an in personam sanction"'
under subsection (2) of 822.15. These penalties provide an oper-
ative deterrent to parental misconduct because the effect of the
sanction is no different than if the court of the original forum
had itself rendered the order. The amount of the sanction is not
specifically limited and may include expenses incurred by a
party and associated witnesses, as well as attorneys' fees. The
necessity for travel, however, may be lessened by use of the
procedures outlined in sections 822.18-.22 regarding the use of
testimony taken in another state.
The information listed in section 822.16 is a mere skeleton
of that which the clerk of court is required to keep in the regis-
try.1 72 The complete file should contain all the necessary infor-
mation listed in section 822.21.173 This will not only simplify
recordkeeping but also provide efficient transmittal of informa-
tion requested by another court. The statutory charge to the
clerk to comply with an out-of-state request is contained in
section 822.17.
822.18 Taking testimony in another state
In addition to other procedural devices available to a
party, any party to the proceeding or a guardian ad litem or
other representative of the child may adduce testimony of
witnesses, including parties and the child, by deposition or
otherwise, in another state. The court on its own motion may
direct that the testimony of a person be taken in another state
and may prescribe the manner in which and the terms upon
which the testimony shall be taken.
822.19 Hearings and studies in another state; orders to
appear
(1) A court of this state may request the appropriate
court of another state to hold a hearing to adduce evidence,
170. Bodenheim, supra note 4, at 1239.
171. See text accompanying notes 93 & 94, 107 & 121, supra.
172. The statute is patterned after the UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUP-
PORT AcT. See Wis. STAT. § 52.10(37) (1975).
173. See text accompanying note 179, infra.
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to order a party to produce or give evidence under other pro-
cedures of that state, or to have social studies made with
respect to the custody of a child involved in proceedings
pending in the court of this state; and to forward to the court
of this state certified copies of the transcript of the record of
the hearing, the evidence otherwise adduced, or any social
studies prepared in compliance with the request. The cost of
the services may be assessed against the parties or, if neces-
sary, ordered paid by the state.
(2) A court of this state may request the appropriate
court of another state to order a party to custody proceedings
pending in the court of this state to appear in the proceed-
ings, and if that party has physical custody of the child, to
appear with the child. The request may state that travel and
other necessary expenses of the party and of the child whose
appearance is desired will be assessed against another party
or will otherwise be paid.
822.20 Assistance to courts of other states
(1) Upon request of the court of another state the courts
of this state which are competent to hear custody matters
may order a person in this state to appear at a hearing to
adduce evidence or to produce or give evidence under other
procedures available in this state or may order social studies
to be made for use in a custody proceeding in another state.
A certified copy of the transcript of the record of the hearing
or the evidence otherwise adduced and any social studies
prepared shall be forwarded by the clerk of the court to the
requesting court.
(2) A person within this state may voluntarily give testi-
mony or a statement in this state for use in a custody pro-
ceeding outside this state.
(3) Upon request of the court of another state a compe-
tent court of this state may order a person in this state to
appear alone or with the child in a custody proceeding in
another state. The court may condition compliance with the
request upon assurance by the other state that state travel
and other necessary expenses will be advanced or reimbursed.
Frequently, participants in interstate child custody cases
find that there is relevant evidence which is not available
within the forum state. The commissioners drew on ideas from
several sources to remedy the situation.1 4 Sections 822.18-.20
are treated together because they are drawn primarily from the
174. UCCJA, supra note 2, at § 18 comment.
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Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act.' 75
The form and availability of discovery devices will differ
depending on the identity of the person seeking the informa-
tion. If the person is a party to the proceeding, guardian ad
litem or other representative of the child, then discovery is
limited to those devices available in the jurisdiction where the
testimony is to be taken.176 Should the court order the testi-
mony, it may specify the manner and terms on which it is to
be taken. Sections 822.19(1) and 822.20(1) provide for inter-
state cooperation in the discovery process.
Section 822.20(2) is virtually identical to section 3.02(b) of
the Interstate and International Procedure Act. The Commen-
tary of the Commissioners, identical for both statutes, empha-
sizes that each "reaffirm[s] the basic freedom" 177 of people to
voluntarily give information for use in a custody proceeding
anywhere outside of the state.
Sections 822.19(2) and 822.20(3) provide two auxilliary
methods for compelling the appearance of a child. 17 The court
may require, as a condition precedent, that a party forward, or
at least agree to reimburse the child's travel expenses. These
sections are considerably more effective than the procedural
statutes in assuring the appearance of the child when the
child's presence is deemed necessary.
822.21 Preservation of documents for use in other states
In any custody proceeding in this state the court shall
preserve the pleadings, orders and decrees, any record that
has been made of its hearings, social studies, and other perti-
nent documents until the child reaches 18 years of age. Upon
appropriate request of the court of another state the court
shall forward to the other court certified copies of any or all
of such documents.
822.22 Request for court records of another state
If a custody decree has been rendered in another state
concerning a child involved in a custody proceeding pending
in a court of this state, the court of this state upon taking
jurisdiction of the case shall request of the court of the other
175. UNi. PRoc. Acr, supra note 72.
176. UCCJA, supra note 2, at § 18 comment; Uwir. PRoc. AcT, supra note 72, at
3.02(b) comment. Compare Umw. PRoc. AcT, supra note 72, at § 3.02, comment with
UCCJA, supra note 2, at § 20 comment.
177. UCCJA, supra note 2, at § 20 comment.
178. See text accompanying notes 64-65, supra.
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state a certified copy of the transcript of any court record and
other documents mentioned in s. 822.21.
The type of information that should be transferred is not
limited by other sections of the Act. This information may
include pleadings, affidavits, depositions, previous court or-
ders, transcripts of judicial proceedings, reports of social work-
ers, psychiatric, sociological and psychological studies, school
records, and reports of any guardians ad litem. Also included
should be any information the court has received from foreign
jurisdictions under other sections of the Act.1"9
The Act's policy of free transferability of information does
not imply that any court which obtains such information may
properly enter or modify a custody decree. A court is still bound
by the jurisdictional provisions of sections 822.03 and 822.14.
Courts and commentators agree that not all tribunals stand in
an equal position to determine the best interest of the child."' 0
822.23 International application
The general policies of this act extend to the international
area. The provisions of this act relating to the recognition and
enforcement of custody decrees of other states apply to cus-
tody decrees and decrees involving legal institutions similar
in nature to custody institutions rendered by appropriate
authorities of other nations if reasonable notice and oppor-
tunity to be heard were given to all affected persons.
An international dispute should not affect the basic opera-
tion of the Act. 181 The underlying principles and purposes of the
Act are still applicable in a case with international aspects.
The only express requirement is that the decree was rendered
by the appropriate authority after reasonable notice and oppor-
tunity to be heard were given to all affected persons. A custody
decree entered by a foreign authority is not required to meet
the jurisdictional requirements of section 822.03. It is sufficient
if the court obtained jurisdiction under its own law." 2
179. See text accompanying notes 108-12, supra.
180. Brooks v. Brooks, 20 Or. App. 43,-.., 530 P.2d 547, 551-52 (1975); Bodenhei-
mer, supra note 4, at 1221; Comment, Conflicting Custody Decrees: In Whose Best
Interest? 7 DUQ. L. REv. 262, 275 (1969).
181. See, e.g., In re Lang, 9 App. Div. 2d 401, 193 N.Y.S.2d 763 (1959), where the
New York court refused to disturb a Swiss custody order. Professor Bodenheimer
describes Lang as the "emerging point of view." Bodenheimer, The International Kid-
napping of Children: The United States Approach, 11 FAM. L. Q. 83, 88 (1977).
182. UCCJA, supra note 2, at § 23 comment.
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822.24 Priority
Upon the request of a party to a custody proceeding which
raises a question of existence or exercise of jurisdiction under
this act the case shall be given calendar priority and handled
expeditiously.
Every child needs the constancy of a known, stable environ-
ment.8"' This is especially important for the child who is the
focus of a custody proceeding. Affected by the trauma of living
on the edge of divorce,1 14 the child requires a quick resolution
of the conflict. Section 822.24 is limited to priority resolution
of jurisdictional questions "because an all encompassing prior-
ity would be beyond the scope of [the] Act." ' 5 If the courts
expect to perform in the best interests of the child, hearings
and other proceedings should be expedited.
ROBERT S. BERMAN
183. Hudak, supra note 12, at 523-24. See generally GOODSTEIN, BEYOND THE BEST
INTEREST OF THE CHILD (1974); Watson, The Children of Armageddon: Problems of
Custody Following Divorce, 21 SYRACUSE L. Rav. 55 (1969).
184. Comment, Alimony, Property Settlement and Child Custody Under the New
Divorce Statutes: No Fault is Not Enough, 22 CATH. U. L. Rlv. 365, 380 (1973).
185. UCCJA, supra note 2, at § 24 comment.
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